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Berkman: Speech as a Weapon

SPEECH AS A WEAPON: PLANNED PARENTHOOD V.
AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE ACTIVISTS AND THE NEED
FOR A REASONABLE LISTENER STANDARD
Alex J. Berkman* **

I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 31, 2009, Dr. George Tiller was shot and killed at his
church in Kansas.1 Prior to his death, Dr. Tiller, one of the nation‘s
only late-term abortion providers, was regularly targeted by antiabortion extremist groups.2 Along with other physicians, Dr. Tiller
had been the target of violence and the subject of ―Wanted‖ and
―Unwanted‖ posters on anti-abortion websites.3 In addition to offers
of rewards for personal information on abortion providers, the websites published, and continue to publish, the so-called ―Nuremberg
Files.‖4 The Nuremberg Files consist of a list of names displayed using different typefaces to signify whether the doctors, clinic workers,
or judges remained alive––normal lettering signified the doctor was
alive, grey signified he or she had been injured, and a line through the

*

J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2009, Stony
Brook University. I would like to thank Professor Eileen Kaufman for all of her assistance
with this Comment.
**
Please note some of the following footnotes may contain Internet sources depicting explicit content.
1
Robin Abcarian & Nicholas Riccardi, Abortion Doctor Fatally Shot; George Tiller Had
Long Been Targeted Over Late-Term Procedures, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2009, at C10.
2
Id.
3
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of
Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1063-67 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (listing physicians who had
been murdered pursuant to ―Wanted‖ posters describing each as an abortionist); Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices: Tiller the Killer Aborted!, THE CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS
SERV., http://christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2013) (naming
abortionists who were either wounded or murdered).
4
See Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (displaying the information contained in the Nuremberg Files).
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name meant that he or she was dead.5
Four Oregon physicians and two clinics sought judicial intervention against the American Coalition of Life Activists (―ACLA‖),
the anti-abortion extremist group that began the use of ―Wanted‖
posters and the Nuremberg Files while advocating the use of violence
in pursuing its cause.6 In Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,7 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction and an award of compensatory damages against the ACLA.8 In reaching its decision, the court
looked to the history of violence in the anti-abortion movement and
the nature of the statements in question.9 The court emphasized that
the violent history of the movement, specifically targeting physicians
and clinics, converted otherwise innocuous statements into intentional threats and intimidation under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (―the FACE Act‖).10
Context, thus, plays a role in the determination of whether a
statement targeting an individual or group of individuals is protected
by the First Amendment, but such classification largely depends on
the standard of review applied.11 In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth
Circuit applied a reasonable speaker standard, an objective test relying on whether a reasonable person in the speaker‘s position would
consider the statement to be threatening.12 Although the reasonable
speaker standard led the Ninth Circuit to render the correct decision
in Planned Parenthood, it is inherently flawed. Opinions regarding
abortion, one of the most divisive issues in America, can vary widely
based on geography.13 This lack of uniformity in opinion leads to a
5

Id.
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062.
7
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
8
Id. at 1088.
9
Id. at 1083.
10
Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006).
11
E.g., United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001); Bauer v. Sampson, 261
F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000); Metz v. Dep‘t
of the Treasury, 780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
12
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074, 1076.
13
See Lydia Saad, Repulicans‟, Dems‟ Abortion Views Grow More Polarized: Republicans Have Grown More Conservative on Abortion Since 1975; Democrats, More Liberal,
GALLUP (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/126374/Republicans-Dems-AbortionViews-Grow-Polarized.aspx (illustrating ―Americans‘ views on the extent to which abortion
should be legal‖ by comparing the outlook of Democrats and Republicans from the years
6
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legitimate concern that one who believes abortion is wrong in all circumstances may consider one‘s effort to end a physician‘s practice
through threats justified. That risk based on one‘s opinion of abortion shows the need for a more concrete, static standard of review.14
This Comment will propose the adoption of a reasonable listener standard, rather than the oft-applied reasonable speaker standard, through an analysis of Supreme Court decisions, the Ninth Circuit‘s reasoning in Planned Parenthood, and an overview of the
violent history stemming from the anti-abortion extremist movement.
The reasonable listener standard would focus on whether a reasonable person in the target‘s place would consider the statements made
by anti-abortion extremist groups to be intentionally threatening.
Section II will discuss the anti-abortion movement‘s history of violence, including the murder of abortion providers and terrorist acts
targeting women‘s health clinics, and the continued use of violent
rhetoric by groups similar to the ACLA. Section III will focus on the
history of free speech limitations and the importance of a historical
context in determining whether arguably threatening speech may be
prohibited. Section IV will examine the importance and impact of
the Ninth Circuit‘s opinion in Planned Parenthood. Section V will
argue for the adoption of a reasonable listener standard by courts
which decide cases involving the use of targeted, threatening rhetoric.
Section VI will discuss the shortcomings of the FACE Act as well as
suggest changes to increase accountability for the use of threatening
rhetoric.

1975 to 2009); Lydia Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions Spark Mixed Reviews,
GALLUP (July 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/148631/common-state-abortionrestrictions-spark-mixed-reviews.aspx (showing how some Americans favor specific types
of abortion restriction laws, but oppose others—―[m]ost Americans favor abortion consent
laws; oppose clinic funding bans, late-term abortions‖); RealClearPolitics Electoral College,
REAL CLEAR POL., http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/maps/obama_vs_mccain/ (last
visited Jan. 24, 2013) (demonstrating the 2008 presidential election results by state). One‘s
opinion of abortion in relation to an identified political affiliation along with election results
establish a correlation between a state and the population‘s assumed perspective on abortion.
Id.
14
See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1088 (finding that the ―Wanted‖ posters naming
the abortionists posed a true threat). The court noted that ―ACLA and physicians knew of
this, and both understood the significance of the particular posters specifically identifying
each of them. ACLA realized that ‗wanted‘ or ‗guilty‘ posters had a threatening meaning
that physicians would take seriously.‖ Id.
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THE RECENT HISTORY OF VIOLENT ACTS AND ASSOCIATED
INTERNET THREATS AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS

Since 1993, the anti-abortion movement has been closely
connected with extreme acts of violence, including abortion clinic
bombings, shootings, and murder.15 On March 10, 1993, Dr. David
Gunn was shot and killed from behind by Michael Frederick Griffin
outside of an abortion clinic in Pensacola, Florida.16 In August of
that same year, Dr. George Patterson was shot and killed after his
name and personal information had been circulated on ―Wanted‖
posters.17
In July 1994, Paul Hill, a member of Defensive Action, an anti-abortion extremist group, shot three people at a Florida abortion
clinic.18 Hill killed Dr. John Bayard Britton and his bodyguard,
James Herman Barrett, and injured Barrett‘s wife.19 When police arrested Hill, who was later found guilty and sentenced to death, he told
police, ―I know one thing, no innocent babies are going to be killed in
that clinic today.‖20 At his sentencing hearing, a woman in the courtroom gallery shouted, ―This man is innocent and his blood will be on
your hands and the hands of the jury!‖21 Hill would go on, while
awaiting execution and even following his death, to become a celebrity in the anti-abortion movement.22

15

See id. at 1063-66 (examining the murders of several physicians as a result of ―Wanted‖
posters by anti-abortionists); Richard Fausset, A History of Violence on the Fringe; Tiller‟s
Slaying Continues a Decades-long Campaign by Extremists Among Abortion Opponents,
L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A11 (―Bombings. Butyric acid attacks. Sniper shootings. Letters filled with fake anthrax. These are some of the tactics used over the years by antiabortion extremists.‖); Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1 (recounting violent acts performed by
those in the anti-abortion movement).
16
Eric Harrison & David G. Savage, Doctor‟s Killing Raises Fears for Abortion Groups,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A1.
17
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064.
18
William Claiborne, Two Killed at Clinic in Florida: Radical Abortion Foe Charged in
Shootings, WASH. POST, July 30, 1994, at A1.
19
Id.; Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First
Amendment, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1175, 1192 (2000).
20
Claiborne, supra note 18 (internal quotation marks omitted); William Booth, Abortion
Clinic Slayer Is Sentenced to Death, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1994, at A1.
21
Booth, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22
See,
e.g.,
The
Paul
Hill,
CHRISTIAN
GALLERY
NEWS
SERV.,
http://www.christiangallery.com/PaulHillWarningLinks.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013)
(memorializing Hill as a hero for his violent acts in the name of the unborn).
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One month later, Dr. George Tiller was shot in both arms by
Rachelle Shannon outside the Women‘s Health Care Services Clinic
in Wichita, Kansas, where he worked as one of the few late-term
abortion providers in the United States.23 Dr. Tiller returned to work
the next day.24 At trial, Shannon stated that she shot Dr. Tiller because she was ―concerned about innocent, helpless babies being
killed by other people who won‘t stop unless somebody stops them,‖
and that though she did not intend to kill him, ―it would have been
right either way to try to stop what he‘s doing.‖25 In December 1994,
two receptionists and five other people were injured when John Salvi
fired a rifle at two clinics in the Boston, Massachusetts, area.26
Towards the end of January 1998, several people were injured
and a police officer was killed when a bomb exploded outside of a
Birmingham, Alabama, clinic.27 Eric Rudolph later confessed to the
clinic bombing as well as the Atlanta Olympic Bombing of 1996.28
On October 23, 1998, James Kopp fired a high-powered assault rifle
into the Buffalo, New York, home of Dr. Barnett Slepian.29 During a
jailhouse interview, Kopp claimed that he intended to wound Dr. Slepian with the sniper attack, but inadvertently killed him when ―the
bullet took a crazy ricochet.‖30 Kopp also stated that he did not regret
shooting Dr. Slepian, but that he regretted the doctor‘s death.31 ―To
pick up a gun and aim it at another human being and to fire, it‘s not a
human thing to do . . . . The only thing that would be worse, to me,
would be to do nothing, and to allow abortions to continue.‖32

23

Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted of Attempted Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
26, 1994, § 1, at 7; Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1.
24
Lianne Hart & J. Michael Kennedy, Woman Charged After Abortion Doctor Is Shot;
Violence: Oregon Activist Is Arrested in Oklahoma After the Wichita Attack. Physician Returns to Clinic, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993, at A1. The shooting occurred less than one week
after a local pastor attempted to publish an advertisement stating that killing of abortion providers was ―justifiable homicide.‖ Id.
25
Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted of Attempted Murder, supra note 23 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26
Abcarian & Riccardi, supra note 1.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Militant Confesses to „98 Sniper Killing of Abortion Doctor, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 21, 2002,
at N21.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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On May 31, 2009, almost fifteen years after Dr. Tiller was
shot in both arms at his clinic and after continued efforts to stop his
practice, Scott Roeder killed Dr. Tiller by shooting him in the head at
point-blank range in the Wichita, Kansas, church that the doctor attended.33 At his trial for the murder of Dr. Tiller, Roeder explained
that in 1993 he realized that murdering Dr. Tiller, or other physicians
who performed abortions, was a means to stop abortions, a practice
he viewed as murder.34 Roeder was sentenced to life in prison.35 As
he was escorted out of the courtroom following his sentencing hearing, Roeder shouted at the presiding judge that ―[t]he blood of babies
is on your hands!‖36 From his jail cell, before his conviction, Roeder
told a reporter, ―I know there are many other similar events planned
around the country as long as abortion remains legal,‖ but refused to
elaborate on what he meant by the statement.37
Besides their profession, the murdered physicians had one
thing in common: in each case, the murder victim had been displayed
in the Nuremberg Files, or on ―Wanted‖ posters distributed by antiabortion extremist groups offering rewards for information about the
doctors and stating that they were guilty of mass murder and must be
stopped.38 In 1998, within hours after Dr. Slepian was shot and killed
in his home, the Christian Gallery News Service, the website that
publishes the Nuremberg Files, put a line through the doctor‘s
name.39

33

Abortion Foe Who Shot a Doctor Is Convicted, supra note 23; Robin Abcarian, Abortion Doctor‟s Killer Sentenced to Life in Prison; Activist Defiant As Judge Rules No Parole
for 50 Years in Slaying at Kansas Church, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 2010, at C12.
34
Robin Abcarian, Killer Says Church Was Only Option: That Was the One Place He
Could Get to Abortion Provider George Tiller, He Tells Jurors at His Trial, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
29, 2010, at A20.
35
Abcarian, Abortion Doctor‟s Killer Sentenced, supra note 33.
36
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (―If I were allowed to display pictures of aborted
babies as you allowed (pictures of) George Tiller lying in a pool of blood, some of the jury
might have been persuaded to find me innocent of murder.‖).
37
Roxana Hegeman, Roeder Says More Violence Planned; Abortion Shooting Suspect
Contacts AP from Jail Cell, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 2009, at 7 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
38
See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064-65 (showing the murders resulting from
―Wanted‖ posters); Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (noting that
the lists often include politicians, police officers, and judges, in addition to abortion providers).
39
Vitiello, supra note 19, at 1199; Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065 (stating that the
Nuremberg Files website opened in January, 1997).
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The Army of God, another anti-abortion extremist group that
espouses the use of violence, which has been characterized as a ―network of domestic terrorists‖ by the National Abortion Foundation
and Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium, published a manual
that called for homicide as the only plausible means of ending abortion, and also included a ―how to‖ guide for acts of violence against
physicians who provide abortions, including arson, making explosives, and butyric acid attacks.40 Michael Bray, the Chaplain of the
Army of God, who along with two other members served time in
prison for bombing the offices of the National Abortion Foundation
and the American Civil Liberties Union in 1984, is credited as author
of the manual.41 Additionally, the Army of God hosted ―White Rose
Banquets,‖ an annual event organized by the ACLA in which
―Wanted‖ posters were often debuted.42 Throughout the Army of
God website, those convicted of murdering physicians are referred to
40

See Cell Strategy and Terrorist Groups: Army of God, TERRORISM RES. & ANALYSIS
CONSORTIUM, http://www.trackingterrorism.org/article/cell-strategy-and-terrorist-groups/
army-god (last visited Jan. 6, 2013) (―The Army of God is a terror organization located in
the United States and is committed to stopping abortion.‖); Anti-Abortion Extremists: The
Army
of
God
and
Justifiable
Homicide,
NAT‘L
ABORTION
FED‘N,
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/army_god.html (last visited Jan. 24,
2013) (showing that in 1984, the Army of God sent a death threat to Supreme Court Justice
Harry Blackmun). Law enforcement first discovered the manual in 1993 at the home of
Shelly Shannon after she shot Dr. George Tiller in both arms. Id. Furthermore, a foreword
to the manual states the following:
All of the options have expired. Our Most Dread Sovereign Lord God
requires that whosoever sheds man‘s blood, by man shall his blood be
shed. Not out of hatred of you, but out of love for the persons you exterminate, we are forced to take arms against you. Our life for yours—a
simple equation. Dreadful. Sad. Reality, nonetheless. You shall not be
tortured at our hands. Vengeance belongs to God only. However, execution is rarely gentile [sic].
Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting The Army of God Manual,
available at http://www.armyofgod.com/AOGsel1.html). Butyric acid is an odiferous, oftennauseating liquid that has been referred to as ―vomit-like‖ and is often used in attacks on
women‘s health clinics to interfere with services and harass those within. History of Violence:
Butyric
Acid
Attacks,
NAT‘L
ABORTION
FED‘N,
http://www.prochoice.org/about_abortion/violence/butyric_acid.asp (last visited Jan. 24,
2013). Between January 1991 and July 1998, butyric acid was used in attacks on clinics
more than sixty times. Id.
41
Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, supra note 40.
42
See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065 (noting that many doctors felt apprehensive
after ―Wanted‖ posters were released at the White Rose Banquets); Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, supra note 40 (naming Michael Bray from the Army of God as the ―host of
the annual White Rose Banquets‖).
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as ―heroes who stood up for the unborn,‖ and the murders they committed are characterized as justified and appropriate.43 On June 19,
2009, Bray published a biblically themed diatribe discussing who was
to blame for Tiller‘s murder, which clearly showed the intent of the
Army of God‘s actions.44 Bray stated the following:
Consider the man George Tiller when he saw
his fate played out in the shooting of abortionists David Gunn, John Barrett, and [Barnett] Slepian. . . . Rather than reaffirm that these men received the due punishment of their murderous deeds, Tiller heard those
who were ostensibly enlightened[,] the putative teachers of Truth and the Law of God by which he would
one day be judged . . . .
....
. . . Of all the places where the blood of Tiller ought to
be shed, it was most appropriate that it spill in full
view of his ―brothers‖ and ―sisters‖ who allowed him
to continue in his sin-filled, blind life. May his death
serve as a wake-up call so that others may repent and
mend their ways.45
The Army of God did not limit themselves to mere acts of rhetoric;
among the known-members of the ―underground network‖ are multiple individuals convicted of murdering physicians or terrorist acts
targeting clinics.46

43
ARMY OF GOD, http://www.armyofgod.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2013); see also Michael Bray, Who Will You Blame?, ARMY OF GOD (June 10, 2009),
http://www.armyofgod.com/MikeBrayWhoWillYouBlame.html (―[T]he leaders of the ‗prolife movement‘ . . . have refused to consistently call abortion murder by affirming the legitimacy of justifiable homicide; i.e., the necessary force required to prevent what is called
murder.‖).
44
See Bray, supra note 43 (stating that although the pro-life movement regarded the murder of physicians to be wrong, the killing of those who provide abortion is justified).
45
Id. (emphasis added).
46
Army of God and Justifiable Homicide, supra note 40. Known Army of God members
included: James Kopp, known as ―Atomic Dog‖ within the Army of God, convicted for the
murder of Dr. Barnett Slepian and suspected in connection with shootings of multiple other
physicians; Eric Robert Rudolph, convicted in 2003 for bombing a clinic in Alabama; Shelley Shannon, known as ―Shaggy West‖ within the Army of God, convicted for shooting Dr.
George Tiller in both arms at his clinic in Kansas; Clayton Waagner, convicted in 2003 for
mailing more than 500 anthrax threats to clinics throughout the United States. Id.
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Prior to the murders of Doctors Tiller, Gunn, Britton, and Patterson, each was featured on a ―Wanted‖ poster at least once.47 These
and other ―Wanted‖ posters frequently featured personal information
such as their home address; their car‘s make, model, and sometimes
license plate number; and even similar information for their family
members.48
III.

THE LIMITS OF FREE SPEECH

Since the early 1900s, the Supreme Court of the United States
has repeatedly addressed the issue of what types of statements, if any,
are unprotected by the First Amendment‘s right to free speech.49 Beginning in 1919, the Supreme Court established the clear and present
danger doctrine in Schenck v. United States,50 which stated that
speech having the potential to incite acts of hysteria, panic, violent
action (or other acts that Congress has the right to prohibit) is not
protected by the First Amendment.51
The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from
an injunction against uttering words that may have all
the effect of force. The question in every case is
whether the words are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent.52
In Schenck, appellants were convicted under the Espionage Act of
191753 for distributing literature that called for people to defy military

47
Michelle Miller, Abortion Docs Decry “Wanted” Posters As Bait, CBS NEWS (Nov. 9,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-6994245.html.
48
Anti-Abortion Extremists Distribute “Wanted” Posters for Abortion Providers,
ALTERNET (Oct. 21, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/10/21/anti-abortionextremists-distribute-wanted-posters-for-abortion-providers/.
49
U.S. CONST. amend. I (―Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.‖).
50
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
51
Id. at 52.
52
Id. (citation omitted).
53
40 Stat. 217 (1917).
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conscription orders.54 In holding that such speech was not protected,
the Court stated that because the literature obviously ―had been intended to have some effect, and [the Court did] not see what effect it
could be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out,‖ which Congress had
the power to prevent, it opened the defendants to prosecution.55
In April and June of 1969, the Supreme Court decided Watts
v. United States56 and Brandenburg v. Ohio,57 respectively, in which
the Court refined the clear and present danger doctrine and established two new doctrines that work better hand-in-hand as a well defined limitation on free speech.58 In Watts, the petitioner, an eighteen-year-old African-American who had recently been classified ―1A‖59 for the draft, was convicted for making threats against the President while discussing the draft with other young people at a rally in
Washington, D.C. 60 In that setting, petitioner stated that he refused
to report to a military physical examination the following week, and
that ―[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle[,] the first man I want to get
in my sights is [President Lyndon Baines Johnson].‖61 The Court
held that although a statement is vitriolic and violent in nature, it is
not the basis for prosecution unless the statement is a ―true threat.‖62
Though the Court did not explicitly define what a true threat is, the
Court did hold that the First Amendment protected petitioner‘s assertion that he refused to honor his draft selection and wanted to shoot
the President in response.63 The Court explained that when taken in
54

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 49.
Id. at 51.
56
394 U.S. 705 (1969).
57
395 U.S. 444 (1969).
58
Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-08 (―What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech. . . . The language of the political arena . . . is often vituperative,
abusive, and inexact.‖ (citation omitted)); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448-49 n.4 (―Statutes
affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the
established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action . . . .‖).
59
See SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., http://www.sss.gov/classif.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2013)
(defining ―1-A‖ as ―available immediately for military service‖).
60
Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06.
61
Id. at 706. Others attending the rally that heard petitioner‘s statement responded with
laughter. Id. at 707.
62
Id. at 708 (holding that the government did not prove that the petitioner‘s statement that
he would shoot the president was an actual or ―true threat‖).
63
Id.
55
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context petitioner‘s statement clearly did not qualify as a true threat.64
The Court stated:
We agree with petitioner that his only offense here
was ―a kind of crude offensive method of stating a political opposition to the President.‖ Taken in context,
and regarding the expressly conditional nature of the
statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not
see how it could be interpreted otherwise.65
Brandenburg reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the
conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader in Ohio for statements made at a
rally that were later broadcast on television.66 The Court reasoned
that any statute infringing upon one‘s freedom of speech could not
stand unless that statute makes a clear ―distinction[] between mere
advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action.‖67 Citing cases
decided after Schenck,68 the Court stated that the clear and present
danger rule was largely discredited in favor of more protective holdings, favoring the rights of individuals or groups advocating the use
of violence as a choice in reaching their goals, while not inciting such
violence.69
The line between what is permissible and not
subject to control and what may be made impermissible and subject to regulation is the line between ideas
and overt acts. . . .
....
. . . [A] prosecution can be launched for the overt acts
usually caused. Apart from rare instances of that kind,
speech is, I think, immune from prosecution.70
The Court further refined the clear and present danger doctrine, re64

Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
Id.
66
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
67
Id. at 449 n.4.
68
E.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S.
466 (1920); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).
69
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (The clear and present danger doctrine has never been
expressly overruled.).
70
Id. at 456-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
65
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placing it with the imminent lawless action doctrine, a test that both
protects one‘s right to make vitriolic political statements while limiting one‘s right to make statements with the intent to incite violent
acts.71 The Court held that advocacy must be ―distinguished from incitement.‖72 The Court specified that:
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.73
The Brandenburg test remains good law, but the Court has
continued to clarify what types of rhetoric and advocacy may be designated as non-protected speech.74 In 2003, the Court, in Virginia v.
Black,75 held a Virginia statute criminalizing the burning of a cross
for intimidation purposes unconstitutional because the statute allowed
for the act itself to constitute prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate.76
In Black, three men were convicted under the cross-burning
statute.77 Barry Black was arrested while leading a Ku Klux Klan rally.78 Jonathan O‘Mara and Richard Elliot, neither of whom was a
member of the Ku Klux Klan, were arrested under the same statute
for attempting to burn a cross on the front lawn of Elliott‘s neighbor‘s
home, an African-American man.79 At the trials leading to appellees‘
convictions, the juries were instructed that they could infer that the
burning of the cross was prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate
and that no further mens rea was required.80 On appeal, the Supreme

71

Id. at 449 & n.4 (per curiam).
Id. at 448-49.
73
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
74
See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
75
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
76
Id. at 364, 367; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-423 (1996).
77
Black, 538 U.S. at 348.
78
Id. at 348-49.
79
Id. at 350.
80
Id. at 349-51.
72
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Court of Virginia found the statute ―unconstitutional on its face‖ and
reversed appellees‘ convictions, stating that the statute had a chilling
effect and was discriminatory in its focus on cross burning.81
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed that the statute was unconstitutional, but declined to follow the lower court‘s
reasoning on whether Virginia could prohibit and criminalize the
burning of crosses.82 Noting the long, and often violent, history of
the Ku Klux Klan, Justice Sandra Day O‘Connor, writing for the majority, stated that the burning of a cross is often directly associated
with intimidation tactics and therefore may be the basis of a ―true
threat,‖ removing any protections afforded by the First Amendment.83
This history of violence associated with cross burning moved the act
from a mere political statement to a statement of intimidation or imminent violent action, which the Court characterized as an example
of a ―true threat‖ rendering it unprotected speech.84 Citing Watts and
Brandenburg, the Court did not explicitly define what a true threat
was, but did state that it included:
[T]hose statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual
or group of individuals. . . . Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of
true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person
or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.85
Furthermore, the Court held that the language used by Black
did not constitute a true threat because the burning of a cross at a rally was not intended to threaten another or incite violence, rendering it
a mere ―political hyperbole.‖86 In contrast, appellees O‘Mara and Elliot used the cross burning with the clear intent to intimidate an Afri81

Id. at 351.
Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
83
Id. at 352-57 (―From the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings have been used to
communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology. . . . Often, the Klan
used cross burning as a tool of intimidation and a threat of impending violence. For example, in 1939 and 1940, the Klan burned crosses in front of synagogues and churches.‖).
84
Id. at 359-60.
85
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
86
Id. (― ‗[P]olitical hyperbole‘ is not a true threat.‖ (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 708)).
82
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can-American neighbor.87 The difference between the appellees‘ actions clearly distinguishes political hyperbole from a true threat.88
Appellee Black was arrested and convicted under the Virginia anticross burning statute while partaking in a peaceful, though vitriolic
rally, which expounded anti-African-American and anti-Semitic rhetoric.89 On the other hand, appellees O‘Mara and Elliott burned a
cross on an African-American man‘s property in retaliation.90
The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is
engaging in constitutionally proscribable intimidation.
But that same act may mean only that the person is
engaged in core political speech. . . .
As the history of cross burning indicates, a
burning cross is not always intended to intimidate.
Rather, sometimes the cross burning is a statement of
ideology, a symbol of group solidarity.91
For this reason, the Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Virginia‘s
decision to vacate Black‘s conviction, but reversed and remanded
with regard to O‘Mara and Elliot.92
The scenario presented in Black parallels the circumstances
leading to the Ninth Circuit‘s decision in Planned Parenthood in
2002.93 The Ku Klux Klan has a history of grotesque violent acts, as
well as violently-toned hyperbolic rhetoric.94 Similarly, the antiabortion movement, dating back to Roe v. Wade,95 has a history of
violence and hyperbolic rhetoric.96 When the line between rhetoric
87

Black, 538 U.S. at 350 (―Their apparent motive was to ‗get back‘ at [the AfricanAmerican neighbor] for complaining about the shooting in the backyard.‖).
88
See id. at 367-68 (―The prima facie evidence provision in this case ignores all of the
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is intended
to intimidate. The First Amendment does not permit such a shortcut.‖).
89
Id. at 348-49.
90
Id. at 350.
91
Id. at 365-66.
92
Black, 538 U.S. at 367-68.
93
Compare id. (calling for the consideration of context in each determination of a true
threat), with Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66 (considering actions that when taken
out of context may constitute political hyperbole, but when in context are clearly true
threats).
94
See Black, 538 U.S. at 352-57 (―From the inception of the second Klan, cross burnings
have been used to communicate both threats of violence and messages of shared ideology.‖).
95
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
96
See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66 (describing the murders and crimes re-
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and violence began to blur, as the publication of ―Wanted‖ posters
were frequently followed by the murder of the physician being targeted, the intent to intimidate and inherent potential for violence following the publication of such statements, similar to the statements
made when one burns a cross on another‘s property, became clear.97
IV.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. AMERICAN COALITION OF LIFE
ACTIVISTS

A mere three years before Dr. Tiller was murdered in his
church, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a permanent injunction against the ACLA and many other anti-abortion groups, prohibiting the publication of the Nuremberg Files
and ―Wanted‖ posters.98 The suit was brought by four physicians and
two clinics under the FACE Act, which provides ―aggrieved persons
a right of action against whoever by ‗threat of force . . . intentionally
. . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or has been . . .
providing reproductive health services.‘ ‖99 At issue before the Ninth
Circuit was whether the ACLA‘s actions constituted a true threat and
therefore were not protected by the First Amendment.100
The ACLA argued that the trial court erred when it allowed
the jury to consider the statements in question in a historical context
because the statements were protected regardless of context.101 ―[The
ACLA] suggests that the key question for us to consider is whether
these posters can be considered ‗true threats‘ when, in fact, the posters on their face contain no explicitly threatening language.‖102 Due
to the lack of a clear intent to threaten through the language of the
sulting from the anti-abortion movement); Vitiello, supra note 19, at 1184 (―[B]ecause Roe
v. Wade was lawless, and because at some future date, some natural disaster ‗might cause the
normal order of government to break down,‘ the creators of the [Nuremberg] files began collecting information about abortion providers and their supporters to preserve evidence for
when they are put on trial for mass murder . . . .‖ (citations omitted)).
97
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063-66.
98
Id. at 1088.
99
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
248 (2006)); see also Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071 (―Congress enacted the FACE Act in 1994 in
an effort to combat the continuing violence against, and forcible interference with, abortion
clinics, those providing or receiving abortion-related services, and their families. . . . To this
end, the FACE Act provides criminal and civil penalties . . . .‖).
100
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1070.
101
Id. at 1072.
102
Id. at 1070-71.
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―Wanted‖ posters and Nuremberg Files, the ACLA maintained that
the First Amendment precluded a judgment against them because the
challenged language was a mere exercise of political speech.103 In response, the physicians argued that the statements must be considered
in a historical context and that the district court did not commit error
because it limited the amount of historical content submitted to the
trier of fact.104
A.

Origins of the Reasonable Speaker Standard in the
Ninth Circuit

Due to the Supreme Court‘s failure to explicitly define what
constitutes a true threat in Watts, the Ninth Circuit looked to related
precedents and to the FACE Act to determine what qualifies as a true
threat.105 The FACE Act does not explicitly state what constitutes a
threat, but instead defines ―intimidate‖ as an act ―to place a person in
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm to him- or herself or to
another.‖106 The Ninth Circuit noted that in Brandenburg, although
the Court did not clearly describe the line that separates advocacy
from threatening speech, the Supreme Court did hold that speech advocating the use of violence is protected, ―so long as the speech is not
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is not
likely to incite or produce such action.‖107
To determine whether historical context should bear on the
analysis, the court looked to Watts and Roy v. United States,108 the
first speech case the Ninth Circuit decided after the Supreme Court
decided Watts.109 Based on the Supreme Court‘s consideration of
context in Watts, the Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the ACLA‘s
plea to have its statements considered without context.110 ―ACLA‘s

103

Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1071.
105
See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071-74 (examining Supreme Court precedent);
see, e.g., Claiborne, 458 U.S. 886; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Watts, 394 U.S. 705; United
States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990).
106
18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3) (2006).
107
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071.
108
416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1969).
109
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074.
110
Id. at 1074-75.
104
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position is that the posters, including the Nuremberg Files, are protected political speech under Watts, and cannot lose this character by
context. But this is not correct. The Court itself considered context
and determined that Watts‘s statement was political hyperbole instead
of a true threat because of context.‖111 Although the Ninth Circuit
took context into account to determine whether the ACLA‘s conduct
constituted a true threat or political hyperbole, an objective standard
of review was still needed.112
In Roy, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a statement by a
marine at Camp Pendleton to a phone operator that he was ―going to
get‖ the President during a visit the following day was a true threat.113
Roy maintained that the statement was innocuous and did not qualify
as a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 871,114 the statute prohibiting threats
against the President of the United States.115 To determine if Roy‘s
statement constituted a true threat removing it from the protections of
the First Amendment, the Ninth Circuit adopted a reasonable speaker
standard.116 The court stated:
This [c]ourt therefore construes the willfulness
requirement of the statute to require only that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral,
in a context or under such circumstances wherein a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of
an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the
life of the President . . . .117
In reaching its decision, the court took into account that Roy was a
marine stationed at Camp Pendleton, that he had ready access to a
large cache of weapons, and that the President would be arriving at
the base within a few hours.118 Ultimately, the court affirmed the
111

Id. at 1072.
Id. at 1074-75.
113
Roy, 416 F.2d at 875.
114
18 U.S.C. § 871 (2006).
115
Roy, 416 F.2d at 876 n.6 (arguing the word ―get‖ did not necessarily imply intent to
commit a violent act).
116
Id. at 877-78.
117
Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
118
Id. at 878.
112
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conviction.119
B.

Comparing Circuits and Affirming the Reasonable
Speaker Standard

Although the Ninth Circuit had an established standard of review for determining if speech constituted a true threat in Roy, it had
never applied the standard to a case involving the FACE Act or antiabortion activism.120 The Ninth Circuit looked to other circuits‘ decisions in similar cases.121 Noting a split among the circuits on the applicable standard, the court considered the differences between a reasonable speaker and reasonable listener standard inconsequential.122
―Although all now apply an objective standard, several circuits have
a ‗reasonable listener‘ test while others have a ‗reasonable speaker‘
test as we do. The difference does not appear to matter much because
all consider context, including the effect of an allegedly threatening
statement on the listener.‖123
Of the cases cited by the Ninth Circuit, but largely glossed
over in the decision, United States v. Hart124 is particularly noteworthy. In Hart, appellant J. Fred Hart Jr., ―a self-declared anti-abortion
activist,‖ was convicted under the FACE Act for parking two Ryder
cargo trucks in the entrance driveway of two abortion clinics in Little
Rock, Arkansas, ―rather than an ordinary parking area.‖125 Hart, like
the ACLA in Planned Parenthood, argued that his actions were protected under the First Amendment and that parking a cargo truck in
119

Id. at 879.
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074.
121
Id. at 1074-75 n.7.
122
Id. at 1075 n.7 (noting that seven circuits apply a reasonable listener standard); see,
e.g., United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Landham, 251
F.3d 1072 (6th Cir. 2001); Hart, 212 F.3d 1067; United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122 (2d
Cir. 1997); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059 (4th Cir. 1994); Metz, 780 F.2d 1001; United States v. Callahan, 702 F.2d 964 (11th Cir. 1983). The remaining five circuits, including
the Ninth Circuit, apply a reasonable speaker standard. See, e.g., United States v. Magleby,
241 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549
(3d Cir. 1991).
123
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7.
124
212 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2000).
125
Id. at 1069-70 (―[E]mployees arriving at the clinics were alarmed by the presence of
the trucks. . . . [E]mployees of the clinics feared that the trucks contained bombs.‖).
120
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the driveway of an abortion clinic was not a true threat nor a violation
under the FACE Act.126 The Eighth Circuit, unlike the Ninth, employed a reasonable listener standard, taking into account multiple
factors cited by the Supreme Court in Watts to decide if a statement
constituted a true threat.127 In addition to looking at the statement or
action in context, the court also considered:
[H]ow the recipient and other listeners reacted to the
alleged threat, whether the threat was conditional,
whether it was communicated directly to its victim,
whether the maker of the threat had made similar
statements to the victim on other occasions, and
whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence.128
By taking these factors into account, the Eighth Circuit examined the
totality of the circumstances in context, as well as how that statement
affected its recipient.129
Similarly, in Metz v. Dep‟t of Treasury,130 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit explicitly outlined the factors to be considered when applying the reasonable listener standard.131 These factors include: ―(1) [t]he listener‘s reactions; (2) [t]he
listener‘s apprehension of harm; (3) [t]he speaker‘s intent; (4) [a]ny
conditional nature of the statements; and (5) [t]he attendant circums-

126

Id. at 1069.
Id. at 1071; see also United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying
the reasonable listener standard to an in-person threat made by an anti-abortion activist to a
physician).
128
Hart, 212 F.3d at 1071.
129
Id. at 1072.
[O]ur inquiry focuses on whether the jury reasonably could have believed that parking the Ryder trucks in the clinic driveways, in light of
the surrounding circumstances, constituted a ―true threat‖ of force. Given the context and manner in which Hart placed the Ryder trucks and the
reaction of clinic staff and patients and others, we conclude that it was
reasonable for the jury to find that Hart‘s conduct constituted a ―true
threat‖ of force.
Id.
130
780 F.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
131
Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002 (citing Watts as a source of factors).
127

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 2 [2013], Art. 13

504

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

tances.‖132 Without considering these factors in a determination of
whether a statement constitutes a true threat, the decision fails to account for the divided opinion on abortion based on geography and
political affiliation in the United States.133 Dr. Warren Hern, a plaintiff in Planned Parenthood who appeared on the Nuremberg Files,
was quoted by the court as having said that ―[h]e was terrified. . . .
[He] felt that [it] was . . . a list of doctors to be killed.‖134 If a case
such as Planned Parenthood were tried in a state where the majority
of the population‘s perspective of abortion is even minimally in line
with that of the ACLA, the reasonable speaker standard is dangerously malleable.
C.

Placing the Merits in Historical Context

In an exhaustive determination of whether the First Amendment protected the ACLA‘s vitriolic rhetoric, the court examined
closely the movement‘s history.135 The ACLA and Advocates for
Life Ministries, another appellant in the case and a group associated
with the ACLA, were unlike other anti-abortion advocacy groups, in
that they subscribed to the use of violence to reach their goals.136
This acceptance of violence as a viable option led to the formation of
the ACLA.137 The founders of the ACLA were previously members
of Operation Rescue, which denounces the use of violence to reach
its goal of ending abortion.138 Following the death of Doctors Griffen
and Patterson in 1993 and Dr. Britton in 1994, Operation Rescue explicitly denounced these acts of violence.139 Operation Rescue,

132

Id.
See Saad, supra note 13 (―Large majorities of Americans favor the broad intent of several types of abortion restriction laws that are now common in many states, but have mixed
or negative reactions to others.‖).
134
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1091-92 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
135
Id. at 1063-66 (majority opinion).
136
Id. at 1064.
137
Id. (The ACLA split off from Operation Rescue due to a difference in position on the
use of violent acts to reach its goal.).
138
Id.; see also History, OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/aboutus/history/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (―Operation Rescue led the largest movement involving peaceful civil disobedience in American history. During those early years, thousands of
men and women willingly sat in front of abortion mill doors to prevent the killing of innocent children and paid the penalty in arrest and prosecution on trespassing charges.‖).
139
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064.
133
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which expressed interest in moving its headquarters to Dr. George
Tiller‘s clinic three years after he was murdered,140 described itself as
having ―led the largest movement involving peaceful civil disobedience in American history.‖141 The ACLA on the other hand ―espoused a ‗pro-force‘ point of view.‖142 This, along with the bloody
history associated with the anti-abortion movement, created the historical framework on which the Ninth Circuit relied.143
In three prior incidents, a ―wanted‖-type poster identifying a specific doctor who provided abortion services
was circulated, and the doctor named on the poster
was killed. . . . [The] ACLA realized that “wanted” or
“guilty” posters had a threatening meaning that physicians would take seriously. In conjunction with the
―guilty‖ posters, being listed on a Nuremberg Files
scorecard for abortion providers impliedly threatened
physicians with being next on a hit list.144
The appearance of physicians on ―Wanted‖ posters prior to their
murder clearly showed that a reasonable person in the speaker‘s place
would consider such rhetoric threatening because ―both the actor and
the recipient get the message.‖145
V.

THE NEED FOR A REASONABLE LISTENER STANDARD

Although the Ninth Circuit reached the correct decision in
Planned Parenthood—affirming the permanent injunction and compensatory damages—the court failed to consider the partisanship regarding abortion that makes the adoption of a reasonable speaker
standard categorically incorrect for cases involving such a divisive

140

Margery Gibbs, Anti-Abortion Group Interested in Buying George Tiller‟s Clinic,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 10, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/10/antiabortiongroup-intere_n_213637.html; OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/aboutus/history (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (saying that the purchase of the building where Dr. Tiller‘s clinic was located forced the operation to close following his murder).
141
History, OPERATION RESCUE, http://www.operationrescue.org/about-us/history/ (last
visited Jan. 27, 2013).
142
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064.
143
Id. at 1063-66.
144
Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
145
Id. at 1085.
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issue.146 Abortion remains one of the most divided issues in America
as shown in a recent poll finding that more than sixty percent of
Americans think abortion should be illegal in most, if not all, circumstances.147 By placing the focus on the party who made the
statement, the standard of reasonableness has the potential to fluctuate based on time, geography, and politics.148 When dealing with
an issue as absolutely fundamental as the right to live without fear of
physical harm or death at the hands of another, the courts should
adopt a more static standard. Application of a reasonable listener
standard provides more certainty and clearer boundaries on what
speech is protected. A reasonable person in the shoes of a physician
who is targeted by an anti-abortion organization which publishes his
or her personal information in a medium with a clear correlation to
gruesome murders would undoubtedly be fearful regardless of extraneous factors such as geography or the region‘s political leanings.
The need to apply a reasonable listener standard in a Planned
Parenthood-like scenario is somewhat unclear in the abstract, but becomes apparent when taken in the context of the current and ongoing
anti-abortion extremist tactics. For example, the Nuremberg Files
and ―Wanted‖ posters continue to be published by Neil Horsley, an
anti-abortion activist who believes domestic terrorism will be the
force that will shape the future of America and who hosts the Christian Gallery News Service, a violently toned weblog.149 Along with

146
See RealClearPolitics Electoral College, supra note 13 (showing the different viewpoints on abortion across party lines); Saad, Common State Abortion Restrictions, supra note
13 (noting the mixed reviews among Americans regarding different abortion laws); Lydia
Saad, Americans Still Split Along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines: Majorities Believe Abortion Is Morally Wrong, Legal Access to It Should Be Restricted, GALLUP (May 23, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147734/Americans-Split-Along-Pro-Choice-Pro-Life-Lines.aspx
(finding that over the last twenty years, Americans are divided on the abortion issue based on
political affiliation, but the majority think that abortion should be illegal in most, if not all
circumstances); Frank Newport & Lydia Saad, Religion, Politics Inform Americans‟ Views
on Abortion: Churchgoing Frequency Is Associated with Strength of Anti-Abortion Views,
GALLUP (Apr. 3, 2006), http://www.gallup.com/poll/22222/Religion-Politics-InformAmericans-Views-Abortion.aspx (―While Republicans as a whole are more likely than
Democrats to have anti-abortion views, identifiers with both parties who frequently attend
church have stronger anti-abortion views than those who attend less frequently.‖).
147
Saad, Americans Still Split Along “Pro-Choice,” “Pro-Life” Lines, supra note 146.
148
See RealClearPolitics Electoral College, supra note 13 (illustrating the different views
on abortion based on location and party affiliation).
149
Neal Horsley, Talk Is Cheap, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV.,
http://www.christiangallery.com/pictures.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013); see also The
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targeting abortion providers, Christian Gallery News Service displays
letters, testimony, and interviews of anti-abortion activists who have
been convicted of crimes—commonly murder and acts of terror—
against physicians and clinics.150 Christian Gallery News Service also hosts a page titled ―Counter Terrorism List For Abortion Abolitionists,‖ which lists the addresses of convicted and fugitive antiabortion terrorists so that other activists, and presumably fans, may
write to them.151 One of the more disturbing, but not unique, posts on
the Christian Gallery News Service is a message entitled ―Biblical
Justice for Baby-Murderers,‖ in which the author, Patrick Johnston,
explains that ―[k]illing a murderer isn‘t ‗murder‘ any more than arresting a kidnapper is ‗kidnapping.‘ ‖152
More recently, Pro-Life Nation, an initiative started by Operation Rescue, ―whose purpose is to implement a comprehensive, unified, and goal-oriented strategy to end abortion in the United States,‖
began hosting a database of ―Wanted‖ poster-style information.153
The website purports to contain information on more than 700 ―AborPropagandist,
S. POVERTY L. CTR. INTELLIGENCE REP., Spring 2002,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2002/spring/thepropagandist (―The 57-year-old Georgian, [Horsley], warns that ‗domestic terrorism heralds
the shape of things to come‘ [and] . . . has become the most public face of anti-abortion extremism in America.‖); Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, supra note 3 (describing the Ninth Circuit as ―hysterical‖ for finding the Nuremberg Files to be a true threat).
150
See, e.g., Linda Wolfe & Neal Horsley, Accused Abortion Clinic Attacker Says FBI
Thinks She Helped Eric Rudolph After He Became a Fugitive, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS
SERV. (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.christiangallery.com/phillips.htm; Neal Horsley, Clay
Waagner Claims Breakthrough in Necessity Defense: Could Affect Jim Kopp Case,
CHRISTIAN
GALLERY
NEWS
SERV.
(Dec.
6,
2002),
http://www.christiangallery.com/WaagnerNecessity.html (displaying interview with man
praised by anti-abortion movement for sending fake anthrax to women‘s health clinics); Jim
Kopp‟s Message to America, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV. (June 7, 2003),
http://www.christiangallery.com/kopptranscript.htm (displaying a transcript from the trial of
the man convicted of murdering Dr. Barnett Slepian in Buffalo, New York).
151
Counter Terrorism List for Abortion Abolitionists, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS SERV.,
http://www.christiangallery.com/counterterrorism.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (―This list
contains contact information, when available, for any person who is captured and/or incarcerated or currently underground for using force to deter and/or arrest terrorists working to kill,
maim, or otherwise mutilate God‘s unborn children.‖).
152
Patrick Johnston, Biblical Justice for Baby-Murderers, CHRISTIAN GALLERY NEWS
SERV. (Sept. 18, 2002), http://www.christiangallery.com/biblicaljustice.htm (referring to the
killing of a physician who provides abortion services as ―enforcing the law, not breaking it‖).
153
Pro-Life Nation Launches with Interactive New Tool: AbortionDocs.org, OPERATION
RESCUE (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.operationrescue.org/archives/pro-life-nation-launcheswith-interactive-new-tool-abortiondocs-org/; see also ABORTIONDOCS.ORG,
http://abortiondocs.org/disclaimer/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2013).
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tionists‖ and 600 ―Surgical Abortion Clinics‖ to ―aid in the end of
abortion through peaceful, legal means.‖154 However, Operation
Rescue has a longer history directly associated with ―Wanted‖ posters.155 In 2010, Philip ―Flip‖ Benham, the former director of Operation Save America (now Operation Rescue), was found guilty and
sentenced to probation for misdemeanor stalking of a North Carolina
physician when he blanketed a neighborhood with ―Wanted‖ posters.156
Such examples, taken together with the publication of information that has frequently been correlated with the murder of physicians, come within the reasoning of Justice O‘Connor in Black:
―[R]egardless of whether the message is a political one or whether
the message is also meant to intimidate, the burning of a cross is a
‗symbol of hate.‘ And while cross burning sometimes carries no intimidating message, at other times the intimidating message is the only message conveyed.‖157 The similarities between the history of the
Ku Klux Klan‘s cross-burnings and the acts of heinous violence
against individuals targeted by such displays (as discussed by Justice
O‘Connor), as well as the publication of physicians‘ information on
the Internet prior to their murder, cannot be denied.158
Admittedly, the Christian Gallery News Service appears to be
a fringe publication of the anti-abortion movement, but the content it
produces has found its way into the mainstream.159 The assault and
subsequent murder of Dr. George Tiller reflects the dangers of the
rhetoric used by the fringe of the anti-abortion movement. Tiller was
even the subject of widespread targeting by such non-fringe figures
as Fox News Channel hosts.160 Bill O‘Reilly, a host on the Fox News
154

Disclaimer, ABORTIONDOCS.ORG, http://abortiondocs.org/disclaimer/ (last visited Jan.
27, 2013).
155
See Franco Ordoñez & Courtney Ridenhour, Anti-Abortion Activist Guilty of Stalking
Charlotte
Doctor,
CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER
(July
2,
2011),
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/02/2423347/anti-abortion-activist-guilty.html
(Phillip ―Flip‖ Benham, former director of Operation Save America, was found guilty of
stalking a physician after releasing a ―Wanted‖ poster targeting the doctor.).
156
Id.
157
Black, 538 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
158
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1083 (noting that the FBI took physicians‘ appearance on ―Wanted‖ posters as a true threat of impending violence).
159
See, e.g., The O‟Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast May 30, 2007)
(adopting nickname for Dr. Tiller created and used by anti-abortion extremist movement).
160
Id.
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Channel, repeatedly referred to Dr. Tiller as ―Tiller the baby killer,‖
while discussing whether the physician‘s actions constituted murder
and trying to relate the topic back to politics.161
Killing babies, that‘s the subject of this evening‘s ―Talking Points Memo.‖ No matter what you
think about the abortion issue, you should be very disturbed by what continues to happen in Kansas. This
man, Dr. George Tiller, known as Tiller the baby killer, is performing late term abortions without defining
the specific medical reasons why. . . . Tiller is executing fetuses . . . .162
Similarly, in January 2012, a North Carolina state representative
called for a return to public hangings for murderers and stated that
―[he] would include abortionists‖ to act as a deterrent to such practices.163 The adoption of extreme statements by individuals in such
prominent areas further establishes the context with which the trier of
fact must interpret a statement and the glaring faults inherent in the
reasonable speaker standard.
Unlike the reasoning used by the Ninth Circuit, if what constitutes hyperbolic rhetoric versus a true threat can change in the national context, the reasonable speaker standard obviously fails to be
objective.164 If a nickname as defamatory as ―the baby killer,‖ commonly used by extremist groups, can move from the fringes of abortion activism to a television news program, the position of the reasonable speaker is obviously too malleable.165 The reasonable
speaker standard also has the potential to fail on a more local level, as

161

Id.; see also George Tiller—The Baby Killer—Link Page, ARMY OF GOD,
http://www.armyofgod.com/GeorgeTillerindex.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2013) (arguing that
George Tiller is akin to Adolf Hitler and that both were guilty of mass murder).
162
The O‟Reilly Factor, supra note 159 (emphasis added).
163
Blue Aardvark, NC State Rep: Public Hanging for Abortion Providers, DAILY KOS
(Jan. 28, 2012), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/01/28/1059346/-NC-State-Rep-PublicHangings-for-abortion-providers.
164
Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7 (stating that there is not a difference between the holding of an Eighth Circuit case applying a reasonable listener standard and the
Ninth Circuit‘s application of a reasonable speaker standard).
165
The O‟Reilly Factor, supra note 159; see also The O‟Reilly Factor (Fox News Network television broadcast June 4, 2009) (stating that the media was attacking him for characterizing Tiller as a mass murderer, when he was merely stating his ―opinion on his methods‖).
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can be seen by the recent erosion of reproductive rights by state governments throughout the United States.166 For example, in Indiana,
the state legislature passed a law that greatly restricts access to women‘s health clinics which provide abortion services by prohibiting
funding of Planned Parenthood facilities, banning abortions after
twenty weeks of gestation and requiring that all providers offer women the opportunity to view an ultrasound before receiving services.167
Also, in January 2012, an appellate court upheld a Texas law requiring doctors to perform an ultrasound on any woman seeking an abortion prior to performing any procedures.168 Even if the patient refuses
to view the ultrasound, Texas doctors are required to describe it to the
patient, unless the woman was impregnated through incest or rape, or
the fetus is abnormal.169 Similarly, in 2012, Virginia passed a bill requiring that any woman seeking an abortion must undergo an abdominal ultrasound, although the original iteration of the bill called for
a transvaginal ultrasound.170 Although such actions by elected officials merely show a great aversion to abortion and a woman‘s right to
choose, they also show that these measures are supported by the population that elected those state officials.
Furthermore, as stated by Michael Bray in his rant regarding
where to place blame for the murder of Dr. George Tiller, many
people may disagree with or even condemn overt acts of violence
against physicians.171 Such a stance says nothing about one‘s sympathies for non-violent intimidation tactics, such as ―Wanted‖ posters

166

See 2011 Mid-Year Legislative Wrap Up, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. 1, 15 (2011),
http://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/state_midyr_wra
pup_2011_8.10.11.pdf (―In at least twenty states, legislation designed to restrict women‘s
access to reproductive health care and impinge on their constitutional rights has already become law.‖).
167
Id. at 8.
168
Terry Baynes, Texas Abortion Law Requiring Doctors to Play Fetal Heart Sounds
Upheld by Appeals Court, NAT‘L POST (Jan. 10, 2012), http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/
01/10/texas-law-requiring-pre-abortion-ultrasound-doesnt-violate-constitution-appealscourt/.
169
Id.
170
Sabrina Tavernise, Virginia: Pre-Abortion Ultrasound Mandate Enacted, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2012, at A21.
171
Bray, supra note 43 (―[T]he leaders of the ‗prolife movement‘ and teachers of the
Scriptures . . . declare such defensive actions to be wrong! They have refused to consistently
call abortion murder by affirming the legitimacy of justifiable homicide; i.e. the necessary
force required to prevent what is called murder.‖).
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and the Nuremberg Files, used in the effort to end abortion. By
adopting a reasonable listener standard, the courts would require the
trier of fact to look to the impact of the statement upon the target, not
what a reasonable speaker, who may have great sympathy towards
those using non-violent, but intimidating, tactics to end abortion,
would consider to be a true threat in a given location, at a given time.
Despite the argument presented by the Ninth Circuit that the
difference between a reasonable speaker and reasonable listener standard ―does not appear to matter much,‖172 the recent attacks on reproductive rights and previous attacks on those physicians that provide
access to these rights say otherwise. A reasonable person in Dr. Tiller‘s position, for example, may have had a much different opinion of
whether the ACLA‘s rhetoric was intended to be threatening than a
reasonable person who shares the ACLA‘s perspective. A claim that
physicians, in the general sense, should suffer or be executed for providing abortions is clearly hyperbolic rhetoric, but when that rhetoric
is targeted at a specific physician, the nature, impact, and purpose of
the statement change drastically.
When viewed from the perspective of the speaker, the determination of whether the statement is intended to threaten is too variable and subject to the sympathies of jurors. In Alabama, Texas, or
Oklahoma, one may disagree with the use of force but consider intimidation a justified tactic to end abortion practices; in California or
New York, that view could change drastically.173 When the statement
is considered from the position of the physician targeted by an extremist group, on the other hand, jurors are much less likely to consider their own sympathies, and more likely to render a uniform, objective standard of review and more consistent verdicts. A
reasonable listener standard provides plaintiffs with a standard that
looks to the impact of a statement in context based on how it affects
those targeted by it, rather than a standard that is largely subject to
the political and religious views of the region or state in which a
claim is brought.

172
173

Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075 n.7.
See, e.g., supra note 13.
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STATUTORY REFORM

With no definition of what constitutes a threat, and minimal
guidelines as to what constitutes intimidation, the FACE Act does not
provide the necessary protection to those wronged by extremists
within the anti-abortion movement, such as the Christian Gallery
News Service or the ACLA.174 For consistent relief to be granted to
those targeted and affected by the intimidation tactics of the antiabortion movement, the statute must be strengthened by explicitly
stating what constitutes a threat, defining intent, and expressly calling
for a reasonable listener standard. Currently, the FACE Act imposes
criminal penalties, including imprisonment for a maximum of one
year for a first offense, three years for a subsequent offense, $10,000
in fines, up to ten years imprisonment for violations that include violent acts, and possibly a life sentence if that violent act causes the
death of another.175 Violation of the FACE Act also opens violators
to civil liability, including $5,000 in statutory damages per violation.176 Though strong on its face, the FACE Act falls short of providing substantive relief to those harmed because it does not provide
a proper foundation for a claim.
To strengthen the statute, Congress should add a definition of
what constitutes a threat. Enumerating the factors stated in Watts
would provide both substantive statutory relief to those wronged, as
well as a clear, explanatory basis for advocacy within the bounds of
free speech.177 The FACE Act currently defines intimidation as the
following: ―to place a person in reasonable apprehension of bodily
harm to him- or herself or to another.‖178 The phrasing of this definition clearly puts the focus on the recipient of a threat, and any definition of threat in the statute should explicitly state that a reasonable
listener standard is to be applied. For example, a threat could be defined as: Any statement made with the intent to intimidate a person or
organization that provides abortion services, or a person seeking
abortion services, using language, that when taken in context, with
the actor having prior knowledge of that context, would cause a rea174
175
176
177
178

18 U.S.C. § 248(e) (2006).
Id. § 248(b).
Id. § 248(c).
Metz, 780 F.2d at 1002.
18 U.S.C. § 248(e)(3).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/13

28

Berkman: Speech as a Weapon

2013]

SPEECH AS A WEAPON

513

sonable target of such statements to be fearful of bodily harm or
death to him- or herself or another. Including the caveat that the actor has prior knowledge of the context in which the statement was
made prevents placing strict liability upon one who may be utilizing
free speech rights without knowledge of the previous crimes perpetrated in the name of the anti-abortion movement. By including these
minor clarifications, the statute would prevent some of the potential
subjectivity inherent in the current interpretation of the statute
through the reasonable speaker standard employed by courts such as
the Ninth Circuit.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the Supreme Court elaborated in Brandenburg, Watts, and
Black, the right to free speech is not absolute and does not provide a
defense when the speech in question is intended to put another in fear
for his or her life.179
The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ―free trade in ideas‖––even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or
discomforting. . . .
The protections afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long
recognized that the government may regulate certain
categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.180
For the anti-abortion movement, the right to protest at women‘s
health clinics remains unquestioned when it does not physically interfere with access to a clinic.181 That right to protest, though, does not
include the right to threaten or intimidate another to reach the goal of
ending abortion.182
As the Court asserted in Brandenburg, Watts, and Black,
speech advocating the use of violence to achieve a goal is protected

179
180
181
182

See Black, 538 U.S. at 358; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707.
Black, 538 U.S. at 358.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(e).
E.g., Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d 1058; Hart, 212 F.3d 1067.
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when stated generally or as a principle, as do many anti-abortion extremist groups, when historical context is not taken into consideration.183 The right to live without being in fear of imminent violence
is fundamental and absolute.184 By comparison, as the Court has
stated for nearly 100 years, the right of free speech is not absolute.185
The rhetoric used by organizations such as Operation Rescue and the
Christian Gallery News Service presents such a circumstance.
Though the right to display nauseating, and often horrifying,
images on placards or on websites is protected speech, there is clearly
a point when actions move from protected speech to true threats,
which do not receive the protections of the First Amendment. In
Hart, the Eighth Circuit, using a reasonable listener standard, found
that the parking of a cargo truck adjacent to a women‘s health clinic
was a true threat.186 What would otherwise be an innocent act was
transformed, in this case the mere parking of a vehicle, to a true
threat, attempting to bomb the clinic, which is clear due to historical
context and the effect the action had on the employees of that clinic.187
Unfortunately, in Planned Parenthood, by putting the focus
on the speaker, the Ninth Circuit adopted a standard that allows for
negative views of abortion and sympathies towards the use of intimidation as a viable tactic to stop abortion to fog the judgment of jurors.
Just as in Black, where a cross was placed and lit on an AfricanAmerican man‘s property, a person is justified in expecting consistency in the determination of whether such speech is meant to intimidate or threaten.188 By adopting a reasonable speaker standard, the
183

Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Watts, 394 U.S. at 707 (―What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.‖); Black, 538 U.S. at 359.
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. (quoting Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447) (internal quotation marks omitted).
184
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (stating that threats which
create a ―fear of violence [and] the possibility that the threatened violence will occur‖ are not
protected by the First Amendment).
185
See supra notes 15-46; Schenk, 249 U.S. 47.
186
Hart, 212 F.3d at 1072.
187
Id. (―These circumstances . . . were reasonably interpreted by clinic staff and police
officers as a threat to injure.‖).
188
Black, 538 U.S. at 350.
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Ninth Circuit precludes any such consistency. Consistency may never be guaranteed, but the adoption of a reasonable listener standard
and its addition to the FACE Act is one step closer to such a goal. To
allow political and religious beliefs to play a role in the determination
of whether a statement targeting a physician in the context of a history of horrific violence is untenable and unjust.
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